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Net profit hits a new low since listing. Why is Joyoung Co., Ltd. continuously retreating?
On March 26, 2026, Joyoung Co., Ltd. (002242.SZ) released its 2025 annual report. This “report card” can be considered the most lackluster one the company has produced since its listing.
When “space technology” meets a performance bottoming out, when non-recurring profit surged 78% yet the awkwardness of five straight declines in revenue remains, this former “No. 1 soy milk maker stock” presents a 2025 annual report that is just like a microcosm of the pains of China’s small home appliance industry during its transition.
As a “national brand” that once monopolized the market with its soy milk maker, Joyoung’s 2025 performance continued to slide, and in the fourth quarter of 2025 it posted a large loss in a single quarter, with a loss of 5.94 million yuan in net profit attributable to shareholders.
Non-recurring net profit soared 78%, but net profit attributable to shareholders declined
According to the financial statements, Joyoung’s revenue fell for five consecutive years from 2021 to 2025, dropping from 10.54 billion yuan to 8.21 billion yuan. Net profit attributable to shareholders continued to decline sharply, falling from 746 million yuan in 2021 to 118 million yuan in 2025, the lowest level since listing.
Source: Wind
What draws the most attention in Joyoung’s 2025 annual report is that “report card” showing a year-over-year increase of 78.41% in non-recurring net profit. It jumped from 119 million yuan in 2024 to 212 million yuan in 2025. In addition, at the end of 2025, net cash flow from operating activities surged 302.69% to 715 million yuan. Meanwhile, the gross margin rose by 1.27 percentage points year over year to 26.77%. These indicators seem to be telling a story of a “performance recovery.”
Image source: Company’s 2025 annual performance report
However, other core data did not look as good. Even more concerning is that, in recent years, the company’s revenue scale has kept shrinking. Judging by the quarterly breakdown, Joyoung’s earnings downturn worsened quarter by quarter in 2025: first-quarter revenue of 2.00 billion yuan and net profit attributable to shareholders of 101 million yuan; second-quarter revenue of 1.99B yuan and net profit attributable to shareholders of 21.2427 million yuan; third-quarter revenue of 1.6B yuan and net profit attributable to shareholders of only 8.546 million yuan; fourth-quarter revenue of 854.6k yuan (benefiting from year-end promotions), but net profit attributable to shareholders flipped from profit to loss, with a loss of 2.63B yuan, becoming the “drag item” for the full-year performance. This “high at the front, low at the back” trend—even a situation of “growing revenue but losing profit”—closely matches the industry rhythm in which the effect of the national supplemental policy (guo bu) weakened in the second half of 2025, and the effect of consumption being drawn down became visible.
According to data from AVC (AVC) across the full channels, in 2025 the overall retail sales value of China’s kitchen small home appliance industry was 66.3 billion yuan, up 3.8% year over year, but the growth momentum mainly came from “guo bu” policy tailwinds and increases in product average selling prices (average price 247 yuan, up 4.2% year over year), rather than expansion in volume. AVC defines this stage as an industry shift from pursuing incremental scale growth toward value-driven growth: the share of the low-end market (below 300 yuan) fell 7.8% year over year to 46.5%, while the share of the mid-to-high-end markets (300–1000 yuan and above 1000 yuan) continued to rise.
Heavier marketing, lighter R&D, and revenue from overseas cut in half
Even more concerning is the “push-pull” between R&D and marketing spending at Joyoung in recent years. In 2024, Joyoung’s selling expenses were 5.94M yuan, and the selling expense ratio rose to 17.02%, a near-term high, but revenue still fell 7.94%. In 2025, even though selling expenses decreased 7.5% year over year to 1.51B yuan, the selling expense ratio remained as high as 16.95%. Compared with peers, Midea Group (000333.SZ) had a selling expense ratio of about 9.39% in 2025; Supor had a selling expense ratio of about 9.7% in 2024; and in the first three quarters of 2025, Supor’s selling expense ratio was about 10.15% (2025 annual report has not been disclosed yet). By comparison, Joyoung’s marketing efficiency is clearly much lower.
Image source: Company’s 2025 annual performance report
But R&D spending has kept contracting. In 2024, Joyoung’s R&D expenses were 361 million yuan, down 7.19% year over year. In 2025, they fell again by 16.07% to 303 million yuan. The R&D expense ratio was only 3.7%, slightly lower than Bear Electric’s (about 4.4% in the first three quarters of 2025). This “heavy marketing, light R&D” business model ultimately leaves the company with weak product innovation, making it hard to cope with industry competition.
Joyoung’s biggest “black swan” in 2025 is undoubtedly the near-halving of its overseas business. The annual report shows that in 2025, the company’s overseas sales revenue fell 48.83% year over year to 825 million yuan, and the share of overseas revenue in total revenue shrank further from 18.22% in 2024 to 10.05%. This decline far exceeds the same period in 2024—overseas revenue was 1.39B yuan in 2024, already down 27.97% year over year.
In 2025, Joyoung’s overseas business gross margin was only 6.59%, down another 2 percentage points from 8.6% in 2024. In the same period, the gross margin for domestic business was as high as 29.02%, meaning the gap between the two exceeded 22 percentage points. This means Joyoung’s overseas operations not only failed to contribute incremental profit, but became a “black hole” that consumes resources.
It is also worth noting that Joyoung’s overseas revenue mainly depends on supplying the U.S. small home appliance leader SharkNinja. When the U.S. swung the “tariff hammer” in 2025, this fragility of “putting all eggs in one basket” was exposed immediately. Joyoung’s domestic revenue was 1.61B yuan in 2025, up 2.04%. Against the backdrop of an overall market downturn, this is still not easy to achieve.
Image source: Company’s 2025 annual performance report
Compared with peers’ 2025 performance, even Bear Electric—also facing pressure—saw overseas business revenue surge 138.84% year over year in the first half of 2025, showing strong momentum in overseas expansion. Public information shows that Bear Electric’s total operating revenue for all of 2025 was 5.24B yuan, up 10.02% year over year, and its net profit attributable to shareholders was 401 million yuan, up 39.17% year over year. Joyoung, however, is still stuck in the mire of overseas ODM contract manufacturing and a single overseas customer structure.
A dependency on large single products turns addictive; diversification strategy fails
Joyoung’s rise began with the soy milk maker—this “national product.” In 2008, leveraging its advantage as a “maker of national standards for soy milk machines,” the company once held an 86% market share and remained the industry leader for a long time. That once made Joyoung successful. However, “success came from the soy milk maker; failure also comes from the soy milk maker.”
Now Joyoung’s “moat” in soy milk makers has already been breached. Brands such as Midea and Supor have expanded into categories including soy milk makers and blender/food processors with wall-breaking technology in recent years, forming a three-way standoff. To get rid of reliance on large single products, Joyoung launched a diversification strategy starting in 2016, rolling out categories such as rice cookers, air fryers, water purifiers, and cookware. But after years of rollout, it ended up in a dilemma of “pseudo-diversification.”
According to the company’s 2025 financial report, segmented by product, the food processing machine series (mainly soy milk makers and blender/food processors) generated revenue of 3.1B yuan, up slightly 3.64% year over year, holding the basic business. The nutrition煲 (nutritional pot) series generated revenue of 3.06B yuan, down 15.62% year over year. The Western-style appliances series generated revenue of 1.53B yuan, down 9.47% year over year. Other home appliance product series generated revenue of 126 million yuan, down slightly 1.19% year over year. Cookware series generated revenue of 331 million yuan, up 5.3% year over year, which is hard to support overall performance growth. This situation of “declining core categories and weak emerging categories” puts Joyoung in a tough spot with no clear way forward or backward.
When Gen Z became a major consumer group and “aesthetics economy” and “lazy-person economy” produced breakout products like Midea’s multifunctional pot (Mofei) and Bear Electric’s health kettles (Beiding), Joyoung also tried to move upmarket—launching its “Space Technology 3.0” series in 2024, with a blender/food processor priced at 2,699 yuan—but its structural problem of “heavy marketing, light R&D” remained prominent. Moreover, in its flagship “Space Technology” line, the “0-coating rice cooker” had been tested by consumers and found to actually contain coating, triggering a reputational crisis.
Capital markets lose interest; stock price stays sluggish
With its performance under persistent pressure, Joyoung’s situation directly transmitted to the capital markets. Joyoung’s stock price and market value have continued to shrink, and investor confidence has been severely lacking. As of March 30, 2026, the company’s closing price was 9.57 yuan per share, down about 24% from the 12.65 yuan per share peak in November 2025. Since 2026 began, the highest stock price has been 11.08 yuan per share and the lowest 9.26 yuan per share. The trading range is narrow and the overall trend is downward, reflecting the capital market’s pessimistic expectations for its performance. Without a clear growth logic, Joyoung’s valuation repair lacks catalysts.
From a historical perspective, Joyoung’s stock price has retreated by more than 80% from its 2020 peak, and the market value has evaporated by more than 20 billion yuan. This “double whammy” of “performance decline + valuation compression” reflects investors’ deep doubts about its long-term growth potential. Although the 2025 annual report shows that the company launched a dividend plan of 1.5 yuan per 10 shares, with a payout ratio of about 97%, this “living off past gains” style of shareholder return cannot hide the fact that the company’s internal growth momentum is weak.
Joyoung’s 2025 annual report is a “mixed bag” response. The positive is that cash flow improved, non-recurring net profit surged, and gross margin increased—showing marginal improvement in operating quality. The negative is that revenue continued to shrink, overseas business collapsed, and R&D momentum was insufficient—revealing deeper difficulties in strategic transformation.
From being a “national brand” that monopolized the soy milk maker market to becoming a “difficult company” with net profit hitting a new low since listing and losses in the fourth quarter, the decline of Joyoung reflects the pains of transforming the company’s business structure. Joyoung’s performance should serve as a warning bell for all traditional small home appliance companies. In the wave of inventory-based competition and technological change, there is no eternal “national brand.” Only companies that follow the trend and keep innovating can ride through the cycle and achieve long-term development. (Produced by 《Financial Weekly—Caishi Hui》)
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article do not constitute any investment advice. Investors act at their own risk.
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