
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to the additional profit opportunities created by the power to order transactions within a block.
On public blockchains, unconfirmed transactions are first placed into a “waiting area” (commonly called the mempool). The party with the authority to determine transaction ordering can rearrange, insert, or exclude transactions, profiting from price differences, liquidation rewards, or sandwich attacks. While not necessarily illegal, this process can impact execution prices and the overall experience for regular users.
MEV directly affects your on-chain transaction outcomes and costs.
When using decentralized exchanges (DEXs), the price you see is only an expected quote. If someone else front-runs your transaction before block inclusion, your final execution price may worsen, and you could experience increased slippage from sandwich attacks. In lending protocols, liquidators compete for rewards when positions near liquidation; if you don’t act fast enough, your assets may be liquidated at a discount.
For developers and protocol designers, MEV influences how fair matching engines and protection mechanisms are built. For validators, MEV is a potential revenue source but may also introduce regulatory risks. Regular traders can save money by understanding MEV hotspots and avoiding high-risk situations.
MEV arises from the interplay of “ordering power” among different network participants.
Transaction Enters the Mempool: The mempool acts as a public waiting queue for unconfirmed transactions, with most nodes forwarding these transactions across the network.
Searchers Develop Strategies: Searchers—those writing automated strategies—scan the mempool for opportunities such as price discrepancies across pools, liquidatable positions, or large token swaps. They bundle related transactions into fixed-sequence “bundles” and submit them downstream.
Block Builders and Validators Decide Ordering: Block builders select and sequence transaction bundles to maximize block value, while validators are responsible for proposing and signing final blocks. Systems like “MEV-Boost” facilitate collaboration, allowing validators to choose the most valuable block from multiple builders.
Settlement On-Chain: The chosen ordering is executed on-chain, and profits from arbitrage, liquidation, or sandwiching are distributed to the relevant parties.
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is an emerging architecture that splits block proposal from transaction ordering. PBS aims to reduce centralization and opaque practices in block construction and is being gradually adopted throughout the ecosystem.
MEV most frequently appears in trading, lending, NFT drops, and cross-domain activities.
The goal is to minimize your exposure to frontrunning and sandwich attacks while reducing potential profits for adversaries.
MEV activity remains robust and continues to evolve in both structure and defense mechanisms.
Throughout 2024, public dashboards show that Ethereum mainnet blocks delivered via relays account for 80–95% of all blocks on most days—indicating that block builder–validator separation has become mainstream. This ratio remains elevated overall, with daily fluctuations tied to market volatility and network congestion.
On high-volatility days, peaks in sandwich attacks and liquidation races are more common. During these periods, fierce gas bidding occurs in relevant blocks. Public estimates reveal stepwise surges in arbitrage- and liquidation-driven “extra revenue” on volatile days, with significant drops during stable periods.
Over the past six months, Layer 2 networks have continued increasing their share of total volume. Cross-domain arbitrage and information latency-driven MEV are hot topics as combined daily L2 transactions often surpass mainnet activity. This trend fuels research into batch auctions, intent-based matching engines, and private relay technologies.
In terms of research and governance, protocol-level solutions centered on Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS), decentralized block building, and privacy-preserving routing are advancing throughout 2024. The aim is to reduce both censorship/centralization risk and negative externalities for everyday users. Refer to public dashboards in Q3–Q4 2025 for concrete data; note that cross-source reporting discrepancies may exist.
These three concepts serve distinct functions.
In a sandwich attack scenario, victims may pay both higher priority fees and receive worse execution prices; attackers profit through transaction ordering. In standard arbitrage situations, arbitrageurs may boost priority fees to ensure inclusion but earn most of their profit from price spreads. Understanding these distinctions helps you optimize fee settings and slippage limits according to your needs.
This is frequently caused by Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). Miners or validators can profit from your trades by reordering transactions in a way that results in less favorable execution prices for you. This phenomenon is especially common in decentralized exchanges, particularly with large trades or during volatile market conditions. Understanding MEV can help you opt for safer trading methods such as privacy pools or batch auction services.
Common MEV extraction methods include:
All these tactics exploit transaction ordering or price differences—your loss becomes the extractor’s gain.
You can take several practical steps:
Zero-Knowledge Proofs conceal transaction details so MEV extractors can’t see your intentions ahead of time. These privacy solutions create encrypted pools where miners and validators do not know transaction specifics—preventing frontrunning opportunities. Although still developing, such technologies are a promising avenue for future user protection.
Yes—MEV issues are more complex and hazardous in cross-chain scenarios. Coordination across multiple chains gives attackers more opportunities to extract value by controlling various steps. Additionally, delays inherent to cross-chain bridging offer longer time windows for extractors to predict and exploit your transactions. Exercise extra caution when using cross-chain services; choose bridges and platforms with strong security records.


