The recent developments in the US-Iran conflict over the past week are continually escalating.

The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division has canceled the “Joint Readiness Training Center” rotation, the normally sea-freighted 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade is being airlifted, and blood bank reserves at U.S. military bases in the Middle East have increased by 500%. The largest U.S. Department of Defense overseas hospital — the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany — has suspended some civilian services.

The last time this combination of actions occurred was just before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In the midst of this heightened tension, Trump suddenly posted that the U.S. and Iran had engaged in “very, very good and productive dialogue,” announcing that the U.S. would pause military strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure for five days. In the early hours of March 27, Beijing time, Trump posted again, extending the pause in strikes until April 6.

The stark contrast between this objective reality and Trump’s statements adds considerable difficulty to analyzing the situation.

However, beyond these public statements, there is another information channel known as the “prediction market,” which attempts to translate the flow of funds into interpretations of event developments, providing the world with a new analytical perspective.

In recent days, this money has begun to concentrate in the same direction.

Multiple insider accounts “align” for an impending ceasefire

In the prediction market, there is a trading event created only three weeks ago, with a trading volume exceeding $50 million: “Will the U.S. vs. Iran ceasefire before ___ Month ___ Day?” If two people with differing views on this market can reach an agreement on “probability,” a matched trade and corresponding event occurrence probability will emerge.

The market’s definition of “ceasefire” is very clear: both parties publicly announce a halt to direct military engagement. Given the continuously escalating conflict mentioned earlier, most people would assume that, under signs of all military tensions escalating, a ceasefire is a small probability event with little hope.

Just as the public thinks, the probability of a ceasefire before April 30 is around 38%, while the probability of a ceasefire before March 31 is only 5%. Many even believe this probability should be lower — those who “overestimate” the probability of a ceasefire are likely gamblers who haven’t even looked at recent news headlines before “taking a chance.”

Yet among these “gamblers,” six accounts appear extremely suspicious. Their total profit of $1.8 million comes entirely from accurately predicting the timing of “U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran” and “Israel-Hamas ceasefire” during 2025, as well as the timing of the current conflict in Iran and the demise of former Supreme Leader Khamenei.

This series of remarkably precise predictions is not their only commonality. As of March 27, they had cumulatively invested $285,000, firmly believing that the U.S. and Iran would ceasefire by April 30, with $185,000 of that in the market for “U.S.-Iran ceasefire before March 31.”

If these six accounts can indeed “foresee the future,” then we can reverse engineer their knowledge of an impending ceasefire to deduce both parties’ positions.

Why would Iran want a ceasefire?

This may be the moment when Iran holds the strongest negotiating position and the most leverage in this war: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up global oil prices, and no other countries besides the U.S. and Israel are directly involved in military actions. The narrative of resistance brought by the new leadership and the surge of patriotism have united public sentiment.

Conversely, if the fighting continues, a series of countermeasures such as the gradual pivot of pro-U.S. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the ongoing depletion of Iran’s military capabilities, and the development of alternative shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz will lead to Iran losing its dominant position at the negotiating table.

At this point, one must address an extremely sharp issue: just before the outbreak of this war, the U.S. and Iran were negotiating in Geneva, and the progress was described by all parties as “productive,” with even “a historic agreement within reach.”

However, the U.S. and Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran while negotiations were still ongoing. With this historical precedent, how can Iran trust that the U.S. will honor its ceasefire commitments?

This brings us to the nature of the ceasefire itself: for Iran, a ceasefire is not a matter of trust but a calculation of interests. If an agreement is reached and the U.S. reneges, Iran will further solidify the narrative of “the U.S. going back on its word” on the international stage; if the agreement is upheld, Iran locks in the most favorable negotiation outcome at the moment.

This also explains why Iran, despite publicly stating “no negotiations,” has maintained information flow through multiple intermediaries and has specifically proposed counter-proposals. The public statements are for domestic audiences, while the actual contacts are aimed at securing the best exit conditions.

Moreover, Iran’s network of proxies has already suffered organizational splits and ammunition depletion in this round of conflict. Coupled with its domestic economy being on the brink of collapse (the Iranian rial has depreciated nearly 90% compared to 2018), a favorable exit may be their optimal solution at this time.

The U.S., the furthest from the battlefield, wants a ceasefire the most

Nearly a month into the war, the S&P 500 Index has fallen steadily since before the conflict, and the Dow Jones has posted four consecutive weeks of losses, marking the longest losing streak in three years; gasoline prices have surged from $2.98 to $3.98, an increase of over 30% in three weeks; the 30-year fixed mortgage rate has risen by half a percentage point; and Goldman Sachs has raised the recession probability to 30%.

These core data points have limited short-term impact on the average American, but they are fatal for Trump — stock prices and WTI oil prices are core indicators of his administration’s performance.

Moreover, the U.S. government’s most ideal response tool at this time — the Strategic Petroleum Reserve — is losing effectiveness due to aging facilities. Since this system, established after the oil crisis in 1975, has a design lifespan of only 25 years, its actual sustainable release capability may only be half of what is officially claimed, or even lower.

More critically, extracting crude oil will further dissolve the internal structure of the salt caverns, meaning that large-scale releases will accelerate system aging. While releasing reserves can indeed help Trump stabilize market sentiment in the short term, if the conflict drags on, the drawbacks of this countermeasure may manifest as soaring oil prices on the candlestick charts.

In addition to financial data, domestic politics in the U.S. are also a factor Trump must weigh in this round of conflict. When the Iraq War began, George W. Bush’s approval rating was as high as 72%; when the Afghanistan War started, it exceeded 90%.

Yet on the first day of this conflict, Trump’s approval rating was below 40%. Even the classic political science phenomenon of the “rally 'round the flag effect” — the rebound in presidential approval ratings due to the outbreak of war — has not occurred in this round of strikes. As of March 25, Trump’s overall approval rating had dropped to 36%, setting a new low for his second term.

Additionally, his campaign promise of “No New Wars” poses a challenge. Trump’s current performance on the U.S. political stage not only jeopardizes the prospects of his core circle in the midterm elections later this year but also erodes the entire Republican Party’s voice in the 2028 presidential election.

On the other hand, Trump has also set a hard deadline of May 14. Due to the need to “stay in Washington to handle current combat operations,” he has postponed his originally scheduled visit to China next week and publicly announced that the trip will be pushed back to May 14.

Everything is changing, but TACO will not change

Currently, there is a term specifically describing Trump’s sudden announcement of positive developments after extreme pressure: TACO. It stands for Trump Always Chickens Out.

However, in the current tense geopolitical situation in the Middle East, many believe he will not TACO, and it is even less likely that he will successfully persuade Iran to agree to a ceasefire.

Three months ago, if someone had told you that Trump would bring Venezuelan President Maduro back to a U.S. court like a chick, use Greenland as a bargaining chip to threaten European allies at the Davos World Economic Forum, and assassinate Iran’s highest leader during negotiations —

These events, previously deemed less than 1% likely, have all occurred. Now, we are looking to see whether the extremely unlikely U.S.-Iran ceasefire TACO will unfold as scheduled in the coming month.

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