The NFL has asked for the delisting of manipulation-prone contracts in prediction markets, and the CFTC respects the league’s position

The National Football League (NFL) has sent formal letters to prediction market platforms such as Kalshi and Polymarket, demanding that they stop offering contracts related to football games that are susceptible to manipulation or whose outcomes can be determined in advance. This move was initiated after consultations with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). CFTC Chairman Michael Selig said that, when assessing which contracts are vulnerable to manipulation, he will respect the opinions of each sports league.

NFL’s Opposition List: Which Contracts Are Deemed to Pose Manipulation Risk

In the letter, NFL Executive Vice President Jeff Miller said that the league opposes contract types where people who can obtain internal information about outcomes can learn about them in advance, or can even directly influence them through individual actions. According to ESPN, the relevant contracts cover the following categories:

Commentator Language Contracts: Broadcasters saying specific words or phrases during the game

Player Contract Contracts: Decisions to trade or sign specific players

Coach Firing Contracts: The timing and conditions under which a specific coach is fired

On-Field Injury Contracts: Players’ injury status and severity during the event

A common feature of the above contracts is the lack of the randomness protection that the final game score provides. Their outcomes can be known in advance—even actively manufactured—by players, coaching staff, or team management, forming the basic structural conditions for “insider trading” as defined in traditional financial markets.

CFTC Delegation Review Power: A Structural Shift in the Regulatory Landscape

(Source: X)

Selig’s statement has regulatory significance that goes beyond this case itself. He said that “the leagues are fully capable of making these decisions,” meaning that professional sports organizations such as the NFL have effectively gained an informal veto influence over the listing of the relevant contracts.

Under Selig’s leadership, the CFTC is actively working to establish its “exclusive jurisdiction” over prediction markets, attempting to unify the currently fragmented interstate regulatory landscape at the federal level. However, gambling regulators in multiple U.S. states are still suing Kalshi and Polymarket under the name of “gambling platforms.” The tension between the federal regulatory position and competition with state jurisdiction has not been resolved.

Legislative Developments and Industry Splits: Two Paths—Confrontation vs. Cooperation

On the legislative front, U.S. lawmakers are introducing multiple bills to address regulatory gaps in prediction markets: one bill would establish an anti–insider-trading mechanism for “extremely unusual bets” appearing in contracts related to Iran; another bill would seek to prohibit the U.S. president and members of Congress from making any trades on prediction markets.

Worth noting is that professional sports leagues have shown clear divergence in their strategies toward prediction markets. The NFL has chosen a direct confrontation approach, explicitly demanding the takedown of the relevant contracts. Meanwhile, Major League Baseball (MLB) has chosen a cooperation path: it has signed an information-sharing agreement with Polymarket, and also signed a memorandum of understanding with the CFTC to preserve a “integrity” framework.

This split reflects two fundamentally different regulatory logics as professional sports organizations face the rise of prediction markets: using administrative pressure to prevent unfavorable contracts from being listed, or building real-time surveillance capability for questionable trades through agreement mechanisms.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why does the NFL think injury and player signing contracts are easy to manipulate?

The outcomes of events such as injury conditions, player trades, and coach firings can be known in advance—even actively influenced—by parties who hold internal information, lacking the randomness protection provided by the final game score. People with insider information can build positions in advance on these contracts to profit, constituting “insider trading” behavior as defined in traditional financial markets. This is the core argument for the NFL’s demand that prediction market platforms stop offering the related contracts.

What does it mean for the prediction market industry that the CFTC follows the leagues’ opinions?

The CFTC’s position effectively grants professional sports leagues an informal veto influence over specific prediction market contracts. This regulatory stance may prompt more leagues to follow the NFL by making similar requests, forming an informal regulatory pre-screening mechanism led by professional sports organizations for contract review. It would have a systemic impact on prediction markets’ sports-related contract product lines.

What possible responses might Kalshi and Polymarket have to the NFL’s letter?

As of the time the report was issued, neither platform had publicly responded. Given that MLB and Polymarket have already established an information-sharing cooperation relationship, prediction market platforms may face a choice: proactively take down the relevant contracts to comply with the leagues’ demands, or adopt the MLB model—trading for the alliance’s trust through agreements rather than confrontation. The CFTC’s clear position makes regulatory pressure for the former option even more direct.