The operational logic of DAO sounds great, but reality is often stark. First, the community raises funds for the developers' retirement fund, and then enters a honeymoon period where various proposals are voted on. Once this fund is overspent, things start to go awry. Internal strife follows, and developers may initiate a malicious takeover attempt to try to regain control. If the takeover fails, they may simply abandon the project altogether. In the end, DAO is a loser in any scenario. Whether the developers successfully maintain control or choose to exit, the community's interests will be harmed. This is the true picture of many DAO governance models - a seemingly democratic voting mechanism ultimately devolving into a game of interests.
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The operational logic of DAO sounds great, but reality is often stark. First, the community raises funds for the developers' retirement fund, and then enters a honeymoon period where various proposals are voted on. Once this fund is overspent, things start to go awry. Internal strife follows, and developers may initiate a malicious takeover attempt to try to regain control. If the takeover fails, they may simply abandon the project altogether. In the end, DAO is a loser in any scenario. Whether the developers successfully maintain control or choose to exit, the community's interests will be harmed. This is the true picture of many DAO governance models - a seemingly democratic voting mechanism ultimately devolving into a game of interests.