As of April 13, 2026, Iran’s uranium enrichment activities have not stopped; instead, they continue to be upgraded across three dimensions: technology red lines, stockpile games, and a verification vacuum. The so-called “abandoning enrichment” is purely a misreading. In reality, the US and Iran are fiercely confronting each other at the negotiation table over this issue.

Technical status: High-enrichment production has become normalized

60% enrichment maintained: Iran continues to produce uranium enriched to as high as 60% at its Fordo and Natanz facilities. This level far exceeds civilian demand (typically <5%), and it is just one step away from weapons-grade (90%).

Stockpile has reached a threshold: According to assessments by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has accumulated about 440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. Theoretically, if this stockpile were further refined, it could produce at least 1–2 nuclear weapons.

Facility hardening: To respond to potential military strikes, Iran has transferred large quantities of high-enrichment material to underground tunnel facilities in places such as Isfahan for storage, and has buried part of the stockpile under ruins to increase the difficulty of retrieval.

Negotiation games: Red lines with no backdown

The core of the recent breakdown in US-Iran negotiations is rights to uranium enrichment:

Iran’s position: In the “Ten-Point Plan,” Iran demands that the US recognize its uranium enrichment rights and lift sanctions. It firmly rejects the US proposals to “export 60% enriched uranium” and “deprive [it] of enrichment rights for the next 20 years.”

US bottom line: The Trump administration insists that Iran must stop all uranium enrichment activities within the country. The Secretary of Defense has even threatened that if Iran does not hand over its stockpile, the US military will “go take it itself.”

Bargaining chips: Iran had proposed a “goodwill plan” to dilute about 450 kilograms of enriched uranium domestically, but it was rejected by the US. At present, this batch of materials remains the core bargaining chip on the negotiation table.

Regulatory crisis: Verification falls into a vacuum

IAEA “blindness”: Since Iran paused full cooperation in 2025, the IAEA has for consecutive months been unable to carry out on-site verification at core facilities. It can only rely on satellite imagery to determine signs of activity, with no monitoring of the stockpile’s true whereabouts.

Latest developments: The chairman of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Islami, recently reiterated that the enemy’s demands to restrict Iran’s uranium enrichment are “an illusion destined to fail,” indicating that technological progress will not stop in the face of diplomatic pressure.

Conclusion: Iran has not only failed to abandon uranium enrichment; it is instead using its high-enrichment stockpile as a geopolitical lever. In the absence of effective verification, the risk of potential breakthroughs in its nuclear capabilities is accumulating.#Gate广场四月发帖挑战