Fixed Income Growth Stalled, Equity Products Shrink! Industrial Bank Fund Faces "Dual Squeeze"

How does the loss of AI and investment research talent lead to the shrinking of equity products?

As a leader in “bank-affiliated” public funds, ICBC Credit Suisse Asset Management has inherent advantages.

Data shows that by 2008, ICBC Credit Suisse’s fund management scale ranked among the top ten in the industry, and has remained stable within the top fifteen since then. As of March 18, 2026, its total public fund management scale reached 897.26 billion yuan.

Generally, “bank-affiliated” public fund companies leverage channel advantages and tend to focus on fixed-income products, with a lighter emphasis on equities—this is a common feature among most “bank-affiliated” fund companies. For example, China Construction Bank-backed CCB Fund had a total management scale of 977.743 billion yuan as of March 11, 2026, with only money market funds managing 76.699 billion yuan, accounting for nearly 80% of the total management scale.

ICBC Credit Suisse differs from other “bank-affiliated” fund companies by maintaining a more balanced product layout.

In recent years, the public fund industry has experienced rapid growth, but ICBC Credit Suisse’s scale growth has been somewhat sluggish. For example, as of Q4 2025, its money market fund management scale was 422.844 billion yuan, an increase of less than 80 billion yuan since 2021, with similar growth trends in its core fixed-income products.

According to the China Securities Investment Fund Industry Association, by the end of January 2026, the total net asset value of public funds was 37.77 trillion yuan, up from 25.56 trillion yuan at the end of Q4 2021. This indicates that ICBC Credit Suisse’s recent growth has been relatively slow.

Stagnation in Fixed-Income Business Growth

Fund products can be simply divided into fixed income and equity categories based on their attributes.

Currently, both fixed-income and equity funds at ICBC Credit Suisse face varying degrees of operational pressure.

First, let’s look at fixed-income funds. Long considered the core advantage of “bank-affiliated” public funds, fixed-income products are the primary choice for expanding scale. On one hand, with the support of the parent bank’s extensive physical network and financial advisors, “bank-affiliated” public funds can directly reach customers and sell products nationwide. On the other hand, the bank’s large customer base, mainly low-risk, conservative investors, aligns well with the investment needs of fixed-income funds, making channel sales relatively easy.

According to Tianxiang Investment Advisory Fund Evaluation Center data, by the end of Q2 2025, there were 15 fund managers with bank as the largest shareholder and product management qualifications, managing a combined scale of about 6.1 trillion yuan. Domestic “bank-affiliated” public funds show a strong preference for low-risk assets, with product structures clearly differentiated: money market funds dominate with 47.6% (about 2.91 trillion yuan), followed by bond funds at 40.9% (about 2.50 trillion yuan), together accounting for 88.5% of the total.

As a traditional “bank-affiliated” fund company, ICBC Credit Suisse’s fixed-income funds previously performed well. By the end of Q4 2021, its bond funds and money market funds managed 200.25 billion yuan and 346.583 billion yuan respectively, totaling 546.633 billion yuan, ranking among the top in the industry. However, in the following years, growth slowed significantly, with bond funds fluctuating around 200 billion yuan, and money market funds, after surpassing 400 billion yuan in Q3 2022, have remained around that level.

Why has ICBC Credit Suisse’s fixed-income fund growth stalled?

This is closely related to the decline of traditional bank channels. In recent years, the sales landscape for public funds has undergone major changes, with internet third-party sales platforms and securities firms rapidly eroding the once-dominant bank channel.

Take independent sales platforms like Ant Fund and Tiantian Fund, which leverage traffic and scene advantages to “overtake on curves.” According to media reports, by mid-2025, Ant Fund’s equity fund holdings surpassed 1 trillion yuan, reaching 1.02 trillion yuan, becoming the first sales institution in the industry to break the 1-trillion mark in this category. Its stock index fund holdings also grew from 391 billion yuan in mid-2025 to 482.5 billion yuan, a 23.4% increase.

Industry analysis indicates that independent sales platforms have significant entry and traffic advantages, enabling more efficient conversion of active platform users into fund clients at lower customer acquisition costs.

Meanwhile, the rise of securities firms’ channels further squeezed the market space for banks in fund distribution. In H2 2025, 57 securities firms ranked among the top distributors, accounting for half of the top 100. Especially in the rapidly growing stock index fund segment, securities firms excel, with a total of 1.32 trillion yuan in stock index fund holdings, accounting for 54.45% of the top 100 institutions. Leading securities firms like CITIC Securities and Huatai Securities saw double-digit growth in their index fund holdings, performing very well.

In contrast, traditional bank channels, despite still holding large scales, have seen growth slow significantly, with increasing industry segmentation. For example, ICBC’s equity fund holdings in H2 2025 were 379.6 billion yuan, up 11.7% from the first half of the year—this growth rate is below the industry average and far less than Ant Fund’s 23.7% and China Merchants Bank’s 24.1%.

Equity Business Faces Greater Challenges

If fixed-income business growth is merely stagnant, the situation for equity business is even more difficult.

Statistics show that by the end of Q4 2021, ICBC Credit Suisse’s stock and hybrid fund management scales were 91.751 billion yuan and 121.481 billion yuan, totaling over 210 billion yuan. By the end of Q4 2025, these had shrunk to just 35.265 billion yuan for stocks and 73.59 billion yuan for hybrids, a decline of over 60% and nearly 40%, respectively.

Meanwhile, the overall industry saw hybrid fund scales grow from 5.2 trillion yuan to 6.8 trillion yuan, a 30.8% increase, but ICBC Credit Suisse’s figures declined.

Why has ICBC Credit Suisse’s equity business shrunk so sharply?

This is directly related to poor fund performance. Data shows that in 2022-2023, its funds experienced large losses for two consecutive years, totaling 45.016 billion yuan (365.41 million yuan in 2022 and 85.75 million yuan in 2023). This period marked a significant scale contraction. Only after the market recovered in 2024 did the funds turn profitable again, with a net profit of 25.755 billion yuan, allowing a slight rebound in equity product scale.

Additionally, in long-term performance rankings, ICBC Credit Suisse’s equity products lag behind. In 2024, during the market rebound, its stock and hybrid funds posted annualized returns of 11.72% and 8.13%, ranking 53rd and 33rd in the industry. During the downturn of 2022-2023, their annualized returns fell below 60th place, showing a pattern of “beating the bull market but losing more in bear markets.” As of January 16, 2026, their three-year average returns were 29.87% and 22.20%, only slightly above industry averages.

Why is ICBC Credit Suisse’s equity business underperforming?

The core reason lies in the loss of investment research talent.

According to reports, ICBC Credit Suisse faces significant talent turnover and challenges in building a strong research team. Since 2022, nearly 20 fund managers have left, including industry heavyweights Yuan Fang, Yan Siqian, Huang Anle, and Zhang Yufan. For example, Yuan Fang, once a core equity investor at ICBC Credit Suisse, managed nearly 50 billion yuan at peak, accounting for nearly 40% of the hybrid fund scale at the time; her flagship fund, ICBC Cultural and Sports Industry A, returned over 200% during her tenure, ranking in the top 5 among peers. Her departure in 2022 is considered a major factor in the sharp decline of ICBC Credit Suisse’s hybrid fund scale.

Similarly, Huang Anle and Yan Siqian, top mid-generation fund managers, also left in 2022. Huang, former head of equity investment, achieved over 20% annualized returns managing ICBC Small and Medium Cap Growth, ranking in the top 5 industry-wide, but his departure impacted the research team. Yan Siqian, a prominent mid-generation manager, achieved a 306.25% return managing ICBC New Energy Vehicles Hybrid A, but also left in 2022 for Penghua Fund.

In fact, beyond equities, core fixed-income talent has also left. In August 2025, fixed-income deputy director Zhang Luozhao quietly resigned from managing over 36 billion yuan in assets, with his successor managing for less than two years. These new managers face significant challenges in taking on core responsibilities. To fill talent gaps, from 2022 to 2025, the company hired 50 new fund managers, 46 of whom were internal promotions managing their first funds independently. However, their growth takes time and market validation, making it difficult to quickly fill the gaps left by departing core talents.

As the industry evolves, the core competitiveness of public funds is no longer based on shareholder background or channel advantages but on professional investment research capabilities. When a fund company cannot retain its core research talents, its professional research ability diminishes, making it difficult to maintain investor trust. Essentially, ICBC Credit Suisse’s development dilemma is fundamentally a talent crisis. How well it addresses talent loss and gaps will directly determine its future development trajectory.

Author’s note: Personal opinions, for reference only.