2028 Restaurant Market Forecast | The Takeout War "Cost No Object" Continues for Three More Years—What Will Happen to China's Food and Beverage Industry?

Ask AI · How Will the Takeout Subsidy War Change the Restaurant Industry Ecosystem?

Recently, to compete for market share, many platforms have launched “takeout wars.” To better predict the impact of these “takeout wars” on China’s restaurant industry, the Hongcanzhiku Industry Research Institute released the “Future Trends Forecast Report for the Restaurant Industry (2026–2028).”

For some time, takeout platforms have repeatedly launched subsidy campaigns such as “hundred-billion subsidies” and “large-scale divine coupons” to fight for market share, trapping many restaurant merchants in a vicious cycle of “no traffic without participation, but participation leads to price cuts and losses.”

If this price war driven by subsidies continues at the current intensity for three years (2026–2028), what will be the cost to the entire restaurant industry? Who will be the ultimate winner, and who will bear the costs? Where will the industry’s endgame lead? The “Future Trends Forecast Report for the Restaurant Industry (2026–2028)” may have the answers.

1. Basic Judgments of the Report

To answer these questions, the Hongcanzhiku Industry Research Institute based its analysis on 2025 restaurant merchant survey data and macroeconomic scenario projections, with the following basic judgments:

If the takeout price war continues at the current intensity until 2028, the restaurant industry will pay a price of approximately 13.18 million store closures over three years—each restaurant can only survive for about a year, completing a structural supply-side cleanup; small and medium-sized restaurants will see net profit per order below 0.6 yuan, approaching industry cost lines, making “more sales, more losses” a reality; supply chain prices will be continually squeezed, with nearly 60% of merchants switching to lower-cost raw material suppliers, and the “involution” competition pressure spreading through all links of the restaurant supply chain, with potential for evolving into structural risks.

△Image for illustration by TuChong Creative

Specifically, regarding operating profit, using the year-over-year change in operating profit of the three major platforms’ takeout-related businesses during the 2025 takeout war as a baseline, even with efficiency improvements and a subsidy reduction rate of 15% annually, by 2028, the total “battle damage” for all three platforms could reach nearly 550 billion yuan. This scale is dozens of times higher than domestic traditional internet subsidy battles such as ride-hailing, community group buying, and shared bikes, and even comparable to the annual capital expenditure of global AI infrastructure giants like Meta and Google’s parent company Alphabet in the current AI arms race.

In terms of scale, this round of subsidy competition has lasted over a year, with cumulative platform subsidies exceeding 100 billion yuan. Food prices and costs have been inverted for a long time, clearly surpassing reasonable promotional behavior. Essentially, the takeout subsidy war is a form of predatory pricing—platforms leveraging capital and resources to enter the takeout industry with large-scale subsidies below cost to seize market share. The goal is to eliminate competitors, ultimately redistributing profits across the entire restaurant supply chain, with both upstream and downstream bearing the consequences.

Other “involution” competitive examples, such as in photovoltaics and lithium batteries, have already provided lessons. These industries relied on capital-driven rapid expansion, then fell into overcapacity and vicious price competition. Under prolonged price wars, the industry entered a negative cycle of “capacity expansion—price decline—losses—further price cuts,” ultimately requiring external policy intervention to stabilize.

Therefore, the industry should be especially cautious: the takeout war is not a cyclical phase event. The large-scale subsidies below cost can cause long-term damage to the restaurant industry and society. If left unchecked, it may evolve into a scenario of “continuous price decline, supply chain contraction, and industry-wide losses.” This will also cause systemic damage to industry structure and market order—dining out, traditionally part of offline physical economy, is being continuously converted into online platform transaction volume.

The costs of this process will be borne collectively by the entire restaurant supply chain, especially millions of individual merchants, small and medium suppliers, and consumers over the medium to long term.

2. Five Core Predictions of the Report

The report indicates that if the takeout subsidy war continues, it will have the following impacts on the restaurant industry:

The proportion of low-price orders will approach 60%, irreversibly resetting the restaurant pricing system

By 2028, 6 out of every 10 takeout orders will be locked in at under 15 yuan (“low-price orders”). Price declines will spill over from takeout to dine-in, with nationwide per capita dining expenditure dropping to 27.8 yuan by 2028. Once consumers develop a low-price mindset, platforms will face dual pressures of order decline and user loss even if they withdraw subsidies. Subsidies will evolve from an optional competitive tool into a structural arrangement that’s difficult to exit.

Industry net profit margin will fall below 3%, with small and medium stores earning less than 0.6 yuan per order, making “high volume, low profit” unsustainable

If the takeout price war persists, by 2028, the industry’s net profit margin will fall below 3%. Small and medium-sized stores’ net margins will shrink to about 1.2%–2.0%, with net profit per order dropping to 0.33–0.56 yuan. Small fluctuations in ingredients, rent, labor, or wastage could push stores from marginal profit into losses. The “more sales, more losses” scenario will become reality.

60% of merchants will be forced to lower raw material standards, turning food safety from isolated risks into structural risks

If the price war continues, by 2028, nearly 60% of restaurant merchants will switch to lower-cost raw material suppliers. Smaller suppliers will exit rapidly, leading to a “concentrated top, fragile tail” supply chain structure. Under continued profit compression, issues like raw material substitution, lowered cold chain standards, and weakened quality control will become prominent, with supply-side quality deterioration difficult to repair in the short term.

About 13.18 million stores will exit over three years, shifting from “incremental competition” to “stock cleanup”

If the price war persists, by 2028, for every 100 new stores opened, approximately 137 will close, totaling about 13.18 million closures—primarily affecting individual and family-run businesses. The wave of closures will spread from tea drinks and snacks to all categories, with the sub-30-yuan price segment becoming the main battleground of high turnover and high淘汰. Store lifespans will shorten rapidly, with the average restaurant only surviving about a year.

The restaurant market structure will be reshaped, with platforms controlling rules and middle- and small-sized merchants and consumers bearing the costs

In this cleanup, platforms will consolidate their dominant role in traffic distribution and pricing rules. Small merchants and suppliers will lose profitability under ongoing price pressures and be forced out of the market. Consumers may enjoy lower prices temporarily, but long-term effects include declining food quality and homogenization of options. The consequences of the takeout war will be borne collectively by the entire restaurant industry chain.

Conclusion

In summary, the consequences of the “takeout war” will be borne collectively by the entire restaurant industry chain, especially millions of individual merchants, small and medium suppliers, and consumers over the medium to long term. For platforms, a more sustainable competitive approach should shift from price wars to efficiency and experience competition.

This article is an original publication by Hongcanzhiku (ID:hongcanzk), authored by the Hongcanzhiku Industry Research Institute.