Mingming is very busy: Easy to find ten thousand stores, hard to find ten thousand products, can the high valuation still hold up?

Questioning AI · Can a company’s profit growth support its stock price under high valuation?

On the evening of March 31 Beijing time, Mingming Very Busy (1768.HK) released its H2 2025 performance report. Since this is the first time after listing that the company discloses an annual report, market expectations were modest. Overall, Dolphin believes that the performance during this period was not problematic. $Mingming Very Busy(01768.HK)

Key points are as follows:

1. Revenue slightly exceeded market expectations. From an overall performance perspective, benefiting from rapid store expansion, Mingming Very Busy achieved revenue of 38.1 billion yuan in the second half, up 35.5% year-over-year, roughly close to the total revenue for the entire previous year, indicating that the company remains in a high-growth stage.

2. Total store count surpasses 20,000. In terms of store opening pace, in H2 2025, Mingming Very Busy net added 5,165 stores, significantly accelerating compared to the first half, with total stores breaking through 20,000. Dolphin speculates that as Zhao Yiming Snacks and Snacks Very Busy teams are deeply integrated, and supply chain and operational systems are gradually connected, the attractiveness to franchisees has noticeably increased. Structurally, since penetration of bulk snacks in third- and fourth-tier cities and counties has already reached high levels, the new store additions in the second half are mainly in first- and new first-tier cities, with the proportion increasing by 1.4% to 19%.

3. Same-store sales decline narrowed compared to the first half. From the perspective of same-store revenue, although the company did not disclose specific figures, combined with survey information, the decline in same-store sales in H2 is in the low single digits, narrowing from the double-digit decline in the first half.

Breaking down volume and price, due to the short-term rapid store density increase causing dilution effects, Dolphin speculates that the decline in average transaction price is the main factor dragging down same-store performance.

4. Gross profit margin exceeds double digits. Looking at gross margin, on one hand, with increased procurement scale, Mingming Very Busy’s bargaining power with upstream manufacturers has further strengthened; on the other hand, in the second half, the company significantly increased the proportion of self-owned brand SKUs, resulting in a 1.9 percentage point increase in gross margin to 10.2%.

5. Operating leverage drives profitability release. Regarding sales expenses, as industry competition eases, Mingming Very Busy reduced defensive promotional subsidies and marketing incentives for franchise store openings, and with the growth of private domain memberships, the company also lowered reliance on external traffic, leading to a 0.5 percentage point decrease in sales expenses to 3.6%. Management expenses temporarily rose due to one-time professional costs related to IPO, but overall, the core operating profit margin in H2 reached 5.2%, a new high.

6. Financial overview:

Dolphin’s overall view:

Looking solely at the performance in the second half of 2025, Dolphin believes that Mingming Very Busy’s growth quality remains relatively high. While store opening speed increased and same-store revenue decline narrowed, more importantly, driven by gross margin expansion, market concerns about the company’s profitability have actually improved.

However, from the current point onward, for a high-growth company like Mingming Very Busy, the most critical factor is assessing whether its growth can be sustained.

Starting with store expansion, Dolphin’s analysis of Mingming Very Busy: Is the transition from “10,000 stores” to “10,000 products” a trap or a blessing? Detailed calculations suggest that the optimistic upper limit corresponds to 35k stores. Considering that the current store count has already reached 22k, and given that rent and location competition in top-tier cities is much fiercer than in counties, and that leasing and property coordination take longer, it is highly likely that store growth will slow starting from 2026.

Regarding same-store growth, whether franchisees or brand owners, for bulk snacks, the future consensus on same-store growth depends on the extent of crossing from “snack shops” to “community discount supermarkets.”

But according to the latest information Dolphin has obtained, although the customer unit price and gross margin of all-category discount supermarkets have increased compared to bulk snacks, the addition of low-turnover categories like daily chemicals, rice, flour, and oil means that the final sales per unit area are still lower than bulk snacks. From this perspective, Dolphin believes this approach is still not very successful. While expanding categories based on snacks is generally seen as a necessary long-term strategy to boost same-store revenue, the uncertain impact of different categories on actual sales per unit area makes Dolphin lean toward the view that short-term category expansion does not significantly improve store sales efficiency, which still depends on product selection and more refined operational strategies.

Finally, from a valuation perspective, after the previous stock price correction, based on the company’s guidance to open 4,000 new stores in 2026, assuming a low single-digit recovery in same-store sales and slight operating leverage release, with a profit growth rate of 28% (corresponding to a net profit of 3 billion yuan), the valuation would be around 23x. Compared to Dolphin’s estimated CAGR of 16% from 2026 to 2029, this still seems high. Plus, the transition to a full-category discount supermarket carries high uncertainty. Therefore, Dolphin suggests waiting until the valuation drops below 15x, corresponding to a market cap of HKD 35k, before considering an entry.

Below is a detailed analysis of the financial report:

1. Overall performance: revenue slightly exceeds market expectations

Benefiting from rapid store expansion, Mingming Very Busy achieved revenue of 38.1 billion yuan in H2, up 35.5% YoY, slightly surpassing market expectations (36.8 billion yuan). This is roughly close to the total revenue for the entire previous year, indicating that the company remains in a high-growth phase.

On an annual basis, the company achieved revenue of 66.2 billion yuan, up 68%. Looking at the trend, the previously over 100% YoY growth rate has slowed.

2. Store opening acceleration in the second half

From the store opening pace, in H2 2025, Mingming Very Busy net added 5,165 stores, significantly faster than in the first half, with total stores surpassing 20,000.

Dolphin believes this is partly due to Mingming Very Busy’s preparation for listing in 2026, which led to a “short-term sprint” through moderate relaxation of franchise policies in H2 2025. Additionally, as Zhao Yiming Snacks and Snacks Very Busy teams are deeply integrated, and supply chain and operational systems are gradually connected, the appeal to franchisees has increased (when the two companies merged in 2024, they were still in management integration and system unification phases).

Structurally, since penetration of bulk snacks in third- and fourth-tier cities and counties is already high, the new store additions in the second half are mainly in first- and new first-tier cities, with the proportion increasing by 1.4% to 19%, following a “rural encircling cities” strategy.

3. Same-store sales decline narrowed compared to the first half

In H2 2025, Mingming Very Busy’s total GMV reached 52.5 billion yuan, up 28% YoY. From the revenue/GMV metric, the take rate in H2 increased to 72.5%, reaching a new high.

Dolphin speculates that this is partly because Mingming Very Busy increased the proportion of high-margin categories like customized products and own brands, actively eliminated low-turnover, low-margin SKUs, and also because procurement scale increased, strengthening bargaining power upstream.

Regarding same-store revenue, although the company did not disclose specific figures, combined with survey data, the decline in same-store sales in H2 is in the low single digits, narrowing from the double-digit decline in the first half. Breaking down volume and price, the dilution effect caused by rapid short-term store density increase is likely the main reason for the decline in average transaction price, which drags down same-store performance.

4. Gross profit margin exceeds double digits

Looking at gross margin, on one hand, procurement scale expansion has further enhanced bargaining power with upstream manufacturers; on the other hand, in H2, Mingming Very Busy significantly increased the proportion of self-owned brand SKUs, resulting in a 1.9 percentage point increase in gross margin to 10.2%.

5. Operating leverage drives profitability release

Regarding sales expenses, as industry competition eases, Mingming Very Busy reduced defensive promotional subsidies and marketing incentives for franchise store openings, and with the increase in private domain memberships, the company lowered reliance on external traffic, leading to a 0.5 percentage point decrease in sales expenses to 3.6%. Management expenses temporarily rose due to one-time professional costs related to IPO, but overall, the core operating profit margin in H2 reached 5.2%, a new high.

Longbridge Dolphin’s historical articles on “Mingming Very Busy”:

In-depth

December 5, 2025: “Mingming Very Busy: Is the ‘Pinduoduo of Snacks’ Geometrically Achieving Success?”

December 24, 2025: “Mingming Very Busy: From ‘10,000 Stores’ Very Busy to ‘10,000 Products’ Very Busy, Trap or Blessing?”**

Risk disclosures and statements in this article: Dolphin Investment Research Disclaimer and General Disclosures