AI Agent Computing Power Arbitrage Model and Its Legal Risk Analysis

With the rapid development of AI Agent (artificial intelligence agents) technology, business models around its upstream and downstream have also begun to spawn some new forms of black-and-gray industry operations.

Within this ecosystem, black-and-gray operators have started treating computing power—this core resource that supports the operation of AI Agents—as an arbitrage target, obtaining it in bulk and using it in a centralized way through technical means.

These related actions are evolving into an organized, scalable, and technical arbitrage model. Its basic logic is:

By using common growth strategies of platforms (such as free usage credits for new users, invitation rewards, membership benefits, etc.), acquiring computing power resources through bulk technical methods, and then reselling them to others at a lower cost, thereby profiting from the price difference.

In this process, such conduct not only may disrupt platform operations and governance mechanisms, but under certain conditions, may also touch criminal risk.

This article attempts to start from behavioral patterns, break down the currently common AI Agent computing power arbitrage routes, and, from a practical perspective, analyze the legal risks they may face.

In the AI Agent industry, computing power is, in essence, a cost resource that can be quantified and consumed.

Many platforms, in order to obtain user scale, lower the usage threshold through free credits, invitation rewards, and similar methods.

Many people consider registering multiple additional accounts so they can use the free credits across different platforms. At this stage, most people do not think there is any real problem.

But if it gradually changes from “using it only yourself” to “starting to obtain these resources in bulk,” concentrating control of multiple accounts to run computing power, or even taking orders from others, charging fees, and helping others provide services to earn profit from the price difference, then the nature of the whole matter is no longer the same.

And it is precisely through this change that conduct that originally seemed to be merely exploiting platform rules starts to be understood as an arbitrage approach centered on computing power, which—under certain conditions—may fall within the scope of criminal assessment.

Below, by combining several typical models, we will break down the risks of this kind of conduct.

1 Pattern One: Obtain computing power resources by leveraging the platform’s new-user growth mechanisms

To grow user bases, most mainstream platforms typically offer new users free trial credits and set up an invitation-reward mechanism.

Under this mechanism, some people begin to batch-register accounts through automation tools (such as scripts and emulators), repeatedly and in large quantities obtaining the computing power resources provided by the platform, or continuously obtaining invitation reward points or computing power by looping through new account registrations and binding invitation codes.

Many people think this is just using the platform’s rules “to the extreme,” and there’s nothing wrong with it. But in actual determinations, the key is not whether these rules are used, but whether technical means are used to repeatedly bypass the platform’s verification mechanisms (such as device identification, SMS verification, etc.), and whether a method for continuously obtaining resources has been formed.

If the conduct has already progressed from occasional use to using tools for bulk operations and stable acquisition of resources, and even further used to provide services to others or monetize them externally, then its nature may change.

In some cases, this kind of conduct may be evaluated from the perspective of “bypassing systems to obtain platform resources,” which could involve** the crime of illegally obtaining computer information system data**; if the relevant conduct relies on special programs or tools used to break through platform protective measures, the making or providing of such tools may also fall within the scope of evaluation for** the crime of providing intrusion, or illegal control, of computer information system programs or tools**; and in situations where a fictitious “new user” identity is repeatedly used to obtain platform rewards for possession and monetization, there is also a risk of being analyzed from the perspective of** the crime of fraud**.

2 Pattern Two: Achieve computing power resale by splitting higher-tier platform benefits

Some platforms provide premium membership accounts (such as ChatGPT Plus, team versions), corresponding to higher computing power quotas or permissions to use multiple seats. Based on this, some people split the usage permissions of a single account; through “carpooling” or overselling, they provide access to multiple downstream users and profit from the price difference.

Many people may believe this is merely a reuse of already purchased entitlements, at most a matter of violating the platform’s user agreement. But in actual determinations, it still needs to be assessed in light of the specific sources and methods of use.

If it is only shared or cost-shared use based on accounts purchased through normal means, it generally stays more at the level of breach of contract or unfair competition, and it is relatively less likely to rise to the level of criminal offenses.

However, if the sources of the relevant accounts have issues—for example, obtained at a low price through abnormal means, or associated with the aforementioned conduct of obtaining resources in bulk—and then monetized externally through carpooling, resale, and similar methods, then that stage is no longer just “shared use,” but may instead be considered as part of the overall chain.

In this situation, whether the actor was aware of the account source, whether they participated in the subsequent monetization, and whether they profited from it will all become important factors in judging risk. Under certain circumstances, it may also be analyzed and identified from perspectives such as** the crime of concealing or disguising proceeds of crime**.

3 Pattern Three: Resale and arbitrage using the platform’s interface capabilities

This kind of model can be understood as follows: the platform provides a “service capability limited to internal use,” while what the black-and-gray industry does is transform this capability into a resource that can be sold to the outside.

By analogy, it is closer to this kind of structure: the platform is like a “cafeteria,” allowing users to use services on-site according to the rules (for example, free generation of content on the web interface), but it does not allow these capabilities to be packaged and taken away or provided for external interface calls.

The platform can bear these costs based on a premise: most users’ usage is dispersed and limited, so the overall cost is controllable. And the so-called “API reverse engineering and parasitism” in essence overlays, outside this system, an additional layer of “collection-and-resale” structure: by obtaining the platform’s internal call paths and verification methods through technical means, transforming originally scattered usage behaviors into centralized, schedulable calling capability, and then charging the outside based on usage volume in the form of an “interface service.”

In this process, the platform bears the computing cost consumption, while this intermediate layer completes resource consolidation and charging to external parties. In other words, operations that could originally only be completed within the platform interface are converted into capabilities that can be batch-called by programs, forming externally offered interface services for charging.

In actual determinations, if the relevant conduct already involves bypassing technical measures set up by the platform to restrict access (such as authorization mechanisms, Token verification, etc.), and extracting and reusing the interface logic, it may be analyzed from the perspective of** the crime of infringement of copyright**; if further services are provided externally in forms such as “API forwarding” or “interface services,” and profits are continuously obtained, there is also a risk of being evaluated from the perspective of** the crime of illegal business operations**; and if the relevant request conduct reaches a high intensity level and causes a significant impact on the platform’s system operation or even function sabotage, it may also involve** the crime of damaging computer information systems**.

4 Criminal Defense Lawyer Risk Warning

Overall, in the AI Agent field, “computing power arbitrage” conduct has gradually evolved from scattered operations into multi-level models that include account acquisition, entitlement splitting, and interface resale.

Against the backdrop of continuous improvement of the digital economy and the rule-of-law environment, supervision over this kind of new online black-and-gray industry is tightening. Technology itself has no attributes; the key lies in the manner of use and the actual effects it produces.

For practitioners, what needs more attention is where their own conduct sits within the overall chain, and the nature and risks that are reflected as a result.