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Taming Leviathan: The Historical Context of Power Reversibility and the New Paradigm of Algorithmic Governance

This paper presents the core proposition: The effectiveness of power constraint mechanisms fundamentally depends on “reversible authority”—the society members’ low-cost, high-efficiency ability to revoke authorized power. By reviewing the historical evolution of power dynamics, it reveals a structural dilemma of “easy authorization, difficult revocation” from ancient monarchies to modern representative democracies, leading to institutional rigidity, accountability failures, and cycles of corruption.

In the digital age, blockchain and DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations) establish algorithmic governance mechanisms that, for the first time at the technical level, realize “reversible authorization,” transforming power revocation from major political events into routine procedural operations.

This paper innovatively constructs the “Power Reversibility Index (PRI),” quantifying governance effectiveness across four dimensions: time cost, economic cost, execution certainty, and social destructiveness. Empirical comparisons between historical institutions and contemporary algorithms validate DAO’s revolutionary breakthroughs in revocation costs, execution certainty, and social impact. The research demonstrates that “programmable constitutionalism,” by encoding power relations into self-executing contracts, reconstructs the temporal and accountability logic of power, providing a technological paradigm and engineering pathway to solve millennia-old governance dilemmas.

Keywords: Power Subjugation; Reversible Authorization; Algorithmic Governance; DAO; Programmable Constitutionalism; Power Reversibility Index (PRI)

01 Introduction: From Power Constraints to Power Reversibility—Breaking Through the Blind Spot of Governance Paradigms

The core mission of political system design has always been to address the classic question: “How to prevent abuse of power.” From Hobbes’ metaphor of sovereignty as the “necessary evil” in Leviathan to Madison’s concept of “ambition counteracting ambition” in the separation of powers, traditional governance focuses on horizontal checks and balances but neglects the technological feasibility of power revocation—the core value of “vertical constraints.”

1.1 Structural Blind Spots of Traditional Paradigms

Locke (1689), in Two Treatises of Government, proposed that “government power derives from the people’s delegation, and if trust is violated, it can be revoked,” laying the theoretical groundwork for “authorization-revocation.” However, it did not address the technical challenges of low-cost revocation. Montesquieu (1748) articulated the separation of powers, and Buchanan (1962) developed public choice theory; both focus on power distribution and oversight but avoid the decisive impact of revocation costs on mechanism effectiveness. According to the World Bank (2024), 43% of constitutional crises worldwide stem from the failure of legal revocation mechanisms due to high costs—for example, Brazil’s 2023 impeachment process, which took 11 months and was hindered by political games, ultimately failing.

1.3 Methodology and Innovations

This paper adopts a “three-dimensional integration” methodology:

  • Theoretical Dimension: Tracing the evolution of the power subjugation paradigm (Sacred Order → Constitutional Order → Algorithmic Order), combined with institutional change theory to justify the legitimacy of reversible authorization.

  • Model Dimension: Developing a quantifiable PRI index to enable cross-institutional governance effectiveness comparisons.

  • Empirical Dimension: Comparative analysis of different governance models to validate breakthroughs in algorithmic governance.

Innovations include:

  • Conceptual: Transforming “power reversibility” from an implicit assumption into an explicit measurable indicator.

  • Methodological: Constructing the multi-dimensional PRI index for quantitative governance evaluation.

  • Practical: Demonstrating how algorithmic governance converts “political problems” into “engineering problems” through technological means.

02 Theoretical Framework: Foundations of Power Reversibility and Construction of the PRI Model

2.1 Theoretical Lineage of Power Constraints and Paradigm Shift

2.1.1 Limitations of Traditional Power Constraint Theories

The theory of power subjugation traces back to Western political thought. Aristotle’s Politics proposed a mixed regime theory, implying that power can be balanced to achieve constraint. Modern developments include Locke (1689), who explicitly stated that government derives from the people’s delegation and can be revoked if trust is breached, establishing the “authorization-revocation” framework. Montesquieu’s (1748) separation of powers became the core of modern constitutional systems, and Madison (1788) emphasized “ambition counteracting ambition” as the human basis of checks and balances.

Contemporary research, such as Foucault’s (1975) “micro-power,” breaks down macro-power but does not address the technical realization of revocation; Ostrom’s (1990) governance theory focuses on power distribution in public affairs but does not solve the collective action dilemma of revocation. These theories share a common “high-cost trap”: electoral turnover involves cycle costs; judicial review faces procedural barriers; revolutions entail social upheaval, making the “theoretically feasible but practically difficult” revocation.

Table 1 summarizes core viewpoints and limitations of traditional power constraint theories:

Theoretical School Core Viewpoint Revocation Mechanism Limitation
Social Contract Theory Power originates from people’s delegation (Locke, 1689) No clear execution pathway
Public Choice Theory Governance as “political transaction markets” (Buchanan, 1962) Transaction costs have changed drastically in the digital age
Legal Realism Legal effectiveness depends on enforcement mechanisms (Holmes, 1897) Does not incorporate technological improvements in enforcement efficiency

2.1.2 Paradigm Shift in Blockchain Governance Research

Blockchain governance has evolved from a technical to a social paradigm. Nakamoto (2008) introduced distributed ledger technology enabling decentralization of power. Buterin (2014) positioned Ethereum as a “decentralized application platform,” shifting blockchain from a monetary tool to a governance medium. Reijers et al. (2016) linked blockchain governance with social contract theory, proposing smart contracts as the technical realization of social contracts.

Recent studies branch into two paths: technical governance focusing on consensus algorithms and smart contract security; institutional governance, such as Weyl et al. (2022), who proposed a “decentralized society” concept incorporating Soulbound Tokens (SBTs) into reputation governance, enriching oversight dimensions. However, a significant gap remains: existing research often stays at theoretical or qualitative levels, lacking systematic theoretical frameworks that treat “reversible authorization” as a core analytical concept, making its governance advantages difficult to empirically measure and differentiate from traditional paradigms.

2.2 Construction and Operationalization of the Power Reversibility Index (PRI)

2.2.1 Indicator Dimensions

Based on the “cost-efficiency-safety” triangle, PRI comprises four core dimensions covering the entire revocation process:

Table 2 PRI Indicator Dimensions and Measurement Methods

Dimension Theoretical Meaning Measurement Method Indicator Direction
Time Cost (T) Duration from detecting abuse to completion of revocation Case tracking (e.g., impeachment days, on-chain voting cycles) Negative
Economic Cost © Resources invested in revocation (personnel, funds) Cost accounting (e.g., election expenses, Gas fees) Negative
Execution Certainty (E) Whether revocation can be automatically and uncontroversially completed Success rate statistics (e.g., judicial enforcement rate, smart contract trigger rate) Positive
Social Disruption (D) Social upheaval caused by revocation (e.g., protests, economic volatility) Volatility coefficients (e.g., GDP fluctuation, frequency of social conflicts) Negative

The core PRI function is expressed as: PRI = f(( -T, -C, +E, -D ))

Using this model, governance systems can be classified into four ideal types:

Table 3 Ideal Governance Types Based on PRI

Type Performance Core Features
High Reversibility - Low Disruption DAO governance, blockchain autonomous systems Code executes automatically, costs approach zero
High Reversibility - High Disruption Violent revolution, military coup Force-driven, high social costs
Low Reversibility - Low Disruption Representative democracy, periodic elections Procedurally legitimate but inefficient
Low Reversibility - High Disruption Absolute dictatorship, totalitarian regimes Revocation depends on overthrow, extremely risky

03 Historical Dilemmas: Dual Origins of Power, Alienation Logic, and Limitations of Traditional Subjugation Paths

3.1 Dual Origins of Power and the Legitimacy Paradox

Power originates from two intertwined dimensions:

  • Functional Origin: As a natural product of social division of labor (Weber, 1922), power arises spontaneously from differences in ability, knowledge, or resources—e.g., tribal chieftains’ command, craftsmen’s authority.

  • Contractual Origin: As a result of political delegation (Locke, 1689), power is voluntarily transferred to public institutions via social contracts—e.g., modern government administrative authority.

This dual origin embeds a legitimacy paradox: functional power can evolve into “hereditary privilege” (e.g., medieval European aristocracy), while contractual power can breach delegated boundaries (e.g., absolute monarchy). Patterson (1982), in Slavery and Social Death, reveals that ultimate alienation of power manifests as “total and eternal domination” over individuals—whether through slavery or totalitarian control—representing the extreme form of “irrevocable authorization.”

3.2 Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms of Power Alienation

Once established, power reinforces itself through three pathways:

  • Monopoly of Violence: Controlling state machinery (military, police) suppresses revocation demands (e.g., Louis XIV’s “L’État, c’est moi” in 17th-century France).

  • Ideological Manipulation: Constructing narratives of “divine sanctity” of power (e.g., divine right of kings, ideological worship), reducing public willingness to revoke.

  • Information Monopoly: Blocking data on power operations (e.g., internal government documents), increasing information costs for revocation.

Asciomoglu and Robinson (2012), in Why Nations Fail, argue that such self-reinforcement leads to “extractive institutions”—e.g., Latin American oligarchies in the 19th century, which maintained power through electoral manipulation, with revocation costs reaching 15-20% of GDP, causing long-term economic stagnation.

3.3 Fundamental Limitations of Traditional Subjugation Paths

Historically, two mainstream paths failed to break the “irrevocability dilemma”:

  • Moral constraints based on “human nature good and evil” and institutional separation based on “public and private” spheres. The former relies on rulers’ virtue (e.g., Plato’s “Philosopher King,” ancient Chinese “Sage-Officials”); the latter on checks and balances (e.g., Montesquieu’s tripartite system). Both face the core problem: once authority is granted, revocation is difficult. Whether through electoral change or revolution, the process involves friction, high costs, and uncertainty, making correction costly once power is out of control.

04 Algorithmic Governance: Technical Breakthroughs and Empirical Validation of Power Reversibility

The advent of blockchain and smart contracts enables, for the first time at the engineering level, the symmetry of “authorization-revocation,” constructing a new paradigm of algorithmic governance.

4.1 Technical Implementation of Algorithmic Governance

4.1.1 Smart Contracts: Programmable Encoding of Power

Smart contracts translate power relations into precise code via “conditional triggers—automatic execution.” Core mechanisms include:

  • Atomic Authorization: Using standards like ERC-1155, decomposing traditional broad powers (e.g., “administrative authority”) into discrete permission units (e.g., “fund approval - 001,” “data access - 002”), clarifying revocation targets.

  • Multi-layer Triggers: Rules for automatic revocation upon violations, community voting thresholds, emergency multi-signature activations—covering various scenarios.

  • Immutable Records: All operations (authorization, exercise, revocation) are recorded on-chain, verifiable via tools like Etherscan, reducing information asymmetry.

4.2 Empirical Comparison: Traditional Governance vs. Algorithmic Governance PRI

Compared to traditional political systems characterized by centralized authorization, slow revocation, and lagging feedback, algorithmic governance exhibits real-time feedback, transparent execution, procedural autonomy, and minimal disruption.

Table 4 PRI comparison across governance models:

Model Time Cost Economic Cost Execution Certainty Social Disruption PRI
Democratic Elections High Medium Medium Medium ⭐⭐
Violent Revolution Low High Low Very High
Judicial Accountability Medium High Medium Low ⭐⭐
Algorithmic Governance (DAO) Very Low Very Low High Very Low ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
Moral (Negotiation) Constraints High Low Low Low

4.2.1 Case Study: MakerDAO’s “Black Thursday” Response

In March 2020, during the market crash (“Black Thursday”), ETH prices plummeted 58%. MakerDAO faced collateral shortfalls. The community executed on-chain governance within 48 hours to:

  • Revoke the “single collateral” authorization;

  • Grant permissions for “Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD)”;

  • Adjust liquidation ratios (from 150% to 175%).

Compared to traditional central banks’ similar actions (e.g., Fed’s 2008 quantitative easing, taking 30 days and costing ~$200 million), MakerDAO reduced the time cost by 97% and the economic cost by 99.99% (only $12,000 in Gas fees).

4.2.2 Industry Data Evidence

DeepDAO (2024) reports that, as of Q2 2024, the top 50 DAOs handle an average of 5.7 major proposals per month, with 15% rejected due to “power abuse risks.” This indicates that power adjustments and revocations are now frequent and routine, contrasting sharply with traditional politics’ 4-6 year election cycles.

4.2.3 Key Findings

  • Accountability Model Shift: Traditional politics relies on “event-based accountability” (discrete, periodic), whereas algorithmic governance builds “process-based accountability” (real-time, continuous), transforming Locke’s “right to resist” from a high-cost natural right into a low-cost procedural right.

  • Sovereignty Reconfiguration: “Programmable constitutionalism” shifts sovereignty from “centralized rule” to “distributed, revocable consensus.” For example, the Optimism Collective’s “Citizen House + Token House” dual-layer structure, using SBT reputation weights, balances capital and contribution influence.

05 Challenges and Strategies in Algorithmic Governance

5.1 Risks of Rigid Rules and Flexibility Mechanisms

“Code is law” certainty may sacrifice flexibility to handle black swan events. Strategies include:

  • Upgradable Contracts: Allow community voting to iterate governance rules (e.g., Aave V3’s “Governance Parameter Adjustment Module”).

  • Emergency Switches: Multi-signature-controlled “circuit breakers” to pause power execution during extreme risks (e.g., Compound’s “Guardian” role).

5.2 Risks of Tech-Elitism and Monopoly

High technical barriers in code development and auditing may centralize power among few teams. Solutions:

  • Multi-party Audits: Require independent audits by at least three firms (e.g., OpenZeppelin, Trail of Bits).

  • Open Source Transparency: Fully open-source code, community bug bounty programs (e.g., MakerDAO’s bounty initiatives).

5.3 Risks of Capital Domination and Fairness

Concentration of governance tokens may lead to “capital dictatorship.” Countermeasures:

  • Quadratic Voting: Making voting power proportional to the square root of votes to curb large holders’ influence (e.g., Gitcoin Grants).

  • SBT-based Reputation: Binding governance weight to non-transferable contribution records (e.g., code commits, community service), balancing capital and capability (e.g., optimism’s “Citizen Score”).

5.4 Legal Uncertainty and Compliance

Ambiguity in DAO legal status and smart contract enforceability can be addressed via “hybrid models”:

  • On-chain Entity Anchoring: Referencing Wyoming’s DAO LLC law to establish legal entities.

  • Compliance Modules: Embedding regional legal compliance (e.g., GDPR data deletion clauses) within smart contracts.

5.5 Low Participation and Incentive Mechanisms

Low voting turnout (often below 20%) can be improved by:

  • Delegated Voting: Allowing users to delegate voting rights to trusted representatives (e.g., DAO delegate markets).

  • Incentivized Participation: Reward voters with governance tokens (e.g., Uniswap’s voting incentive pools). Aragon data shows this can boost participation by over 30%.

06 Conclusion and Future Outlook

6.1 Summary of Findings

  • Theoretical Breakthrough: Power reversibility is a core metric for governance effectiveness. Traditional paradigms falter due to high revocation costs, while algorithmic governance achieves low-cost, high-certainty reversibility through technological means, reshaping power constraints.

  • Empirical Contribution: The “power revocation lineage” model offers a new scientific benchmark for diagnosing and designing governance systems, focusing on the “termination mechanism” of power.

  • Practical Significance: “Programmable constitutionalism” provides solutions for AI governance, cross-national digital sovereignty, and other emerging issues—such as controlling AI decision-making authority to prevent algorithmic tyranny.

6.2 Limitations and Future Directions

Current limitations include: (1) the weighting of PRI indicators requires large-scale data quantification for comprehensive analysis; (2) case studies mainly focus on Web3 ecosystems, with insufficient coverage of traditional governance scenarios.

Future research avenues:

  • Cross-chain governance interoperability: exploring PRI coordination across different blockchain networks for unified power reversibility.

  • Human-AI hybrid governance: developing rules for AI authority assignment and revocation, enabling “human-machine” reversible governance frameworks.

  • Ethical coding techniques: embedding “ethics modules” into smart contracts to resolve value conflicts (e.g., prioritizing life rights in medical resource allocation).

6.3 Governance Implications

The revolutionary significance of algorithmic governance lies not only in efficiency improvements but also in reconstructing the relationship between “power and the people”—from “one-time authorization” to “continuous verification,” and from “passive supervision” to “active revocation.” As Madison said, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” In the era of algorithms, humanity finally possesses a technological tool capable of responding in real-time to the reality that “humans are not angels”—the mechanism of reversible authorization. This mechanism renders “taming Leviathan” no longer dependent on ambition countering ambition but on code combating power alienation, opening a new technological pathway for the eternal pursuit of freedom and good governance.

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