Dự đoán "Trump khi nào kết thúc chiến tranh"? Đây là năm điểm chính

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Iran’s war has become the strongest geopolitical shock to the global energy market since the Gulf War in 1990.

Since the outbreak of the Iran war on February 26, 2026, Brent crude oil has surged by 44% in just 25 days, with U.S. gasoline wholesale prices (Rbob) rising by 48%, U.S. diesel prices up by 51%, and European diesel prices increasing by 58%.

Barclays Capital’s latest research report warns: when the war ends will directly determine whether oil prices return to the baseline scenario of $85/barrel or break through $110/barrel. For investors, five key catalytic factors—military objective progress, congressional funding battles, U.S. military casualty numbers, gasoline retail prices, and Trump’s personal judgment—are critical variables in current energy market pricing.

Barclays believes that oil price trends will fork at three key time points: if the Strait of Hormuz returns to normal passage in early April, Barclays maintains its baseline forecast for Brent crude oil at $85/barrel for 2026; if delayed until late April, the average price may be re-priced to about $98/barrel; if delayed until the end of May, the average price could reach $111/barrel. Each day’s delay accumulates inventory gaps that transmit backward with a snowball effect, raising the price center.

Five Key Factors: Core Variables Determining the War’s Conclusion

Barclays public policy analyst Michael McLean has outlined five possible catalytic factors that could end the Iran war:

Key Point 1: Achievement of Military Objectives

According to CCTV news, the U.S. has previously clarified three objectives regarding Iran: to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities; to strike Iran’s navy to maintain passage through the Strait of Hormuz; and to destroy Iran’s military and industrial foundations, rendering it incapable of external attacks for many years. Notably, regime change or Iran’s nuclear program is not included among the objectives.

President Trump estimated at the war’s onset that the actions would last “four to five weeks.” Currently, the war has entered its third week, and according to the White House, it may be at a midpoint.

However, from the perspective of the number of targets being struck, the U.S. Central Command has not shown a clear inflection point of action contraction, with additional forces still being deployed. Although the frequency of Iran’s ballistic missile and drone attacks on the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain has significantly decreased, it has not completely stopped, indicating that Iran still possesses a certain level of offensive capability. Barclays believes that until relevant indicators further decrease, it cannot be determined that military objectives have been achieved.

Key Point 2: Congressional Constraints—The War Powers Act Sets a Hard Deadline of May 31

The War Powers Act stipulates that the president must obtain congressional authorization (AUMF) within 60 days after deploying armed forces and submitting a report to Congress, with an additional possible 30-day extension; military actions must be forcibly terminated after 90 days. Trump submitted a report on March 2, thus the 90-day hard deadline is calculated to be May 31.

AUMF requires 60 votes in the Senate to pass, while the Republicans currently hold only 53 seats. The Democrats have passed two opposing resolutions to clearly express their stance—therefore, AUMF is highly unlikely to pass, and May 31 represents a systemic hard boundary for the end of war.

The economic cost of the war is also accumulating rapidly: approximately $11 to $12 billion in the first week, with current daily operating costs reduced to about $500 million, bringing the total estimated expenditure to about $21 billion so far.

In comparison, the nominal cost of the Iraq War over 13 years was $815 billion; the total discretionary defense spending for FY 2026 is $839 billion. Additionally, “One Big Beautiful Bill” has pre-allocated $150 billion to the Department of Defense, providing some temporary funding buffer.

Key Point 3: Rising U.S. Military Casualties Will Further Erode Public Support

Barclays states that domestic support for this war in the U.S. is remarkably weak and shows clear partisan division.

As of March 22, the average from RealClearPolitics polls shows that support is only 41%, with opposition at 49%. President Trump’s overall approval rating has dropped slightly from 43% to 42%, marking a record low for his second term (the lowest during his first term was 37% in December 2017).

Currently, 13 U.S. soldiers have died.

Historical experience shows that wars typically bring about a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, temporarily boosting presidential approval ratings, but Trump has not gained this effect. The general rule is that the longer the war lasts, the higher the casualties, and the more pessimistic the public is about victory prospects, the stronger the anti-war sentiment becomes.

Key Point 4: Gasoline Prices Touch the “Political Red Line”—$5/Gallon is the Key Threshold

In July 2022, during Biden’s presidency, the national average gasoline price peaked at $5.01/gallon.

For the Republicans, not exceeding this “Biden peak” is a psychological political barrier, corresponding to a WTI oil price of about $120/barrel, which is more than 20% higher than the current oil prices.

Currently, Republican officials still hold a relatively optimistic attitude, believing that even if oil prices are under short-term pressure, there is enough time for them to fall back after the war ends before Labor Day (when investors truly start paying attention to the midterm elections). The administration has also taken a series of measures in an attempt to alleviate oil price pressure, including releasing strategic reserves and waiving related sanctions.

Key Point 5: Trump’s “Victory Announcement” Active Turn

Barclays believes that regardless of the actual progress on the battlefield, there remains a possibility: Trump may actively announce victory and end the war at some point. Previously, when asked how to determine when the war would end, Trump’s answer was thought-provoking—“when I feel it in my bones.”

Barclays clearly points out that the timing of this catalytic factor is almost completely unpredictable.

In communications with clients, a mainstream analogy suggests that Trump’s previous policy shift after “Liberation Day” (the tariff announcement on April 2, 2025) has conditioned investors to reflexively believe that a market crash could drive Trump to turn around.

However, Barclays believes that the current market response is not yet “panic enough”: after Liberation Day, the S&P 500 index fell by about 12%, while during this war, it has only dropped by about 5%; the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasuries jumped 60 basis points after Liberation Day, while this time it has only risen by about 40 basis points; investment-grade credit spreads widened by 26 basis points after Liberation Day, while this time the peak has only widened by 9 basis points. More importantly, pausing a single tariff executive order is far easier than ending a real war.

Significant Skew in Upward Oil Price Risks

Barclays’ core judgment is that the current rise in oil prices is not a speculative bubble, but rather a reflection of real supply-demand imbalance.

Before the war, the implied historical fair value of Brent crude oil relative to OECD inventory levels was undervalued by about 19%, and the relative replacement cost model was undervalued by about 15%; the net speculative long positions in Brent and WTI were at the second percentile historically low level since 2014 at the end of 2025.

The dynamic evolution of the five catalytic factors—military objective progress, congressional funding battles, U.S. military casualty numbers, gasoline retail prices, and Trump’s personal judgment—will be the most important high-frequency tracking dimensions for judging the direction of the energy market moving forward. Barclays clearly points out that, under uncertainty, the risk of the $85/barrel forecast for Brent crude oil in 2026 is skewed upward.

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